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This paper assesses recent theorising and empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal
policy—taxes, public expenditures and budget deficits—on long-run growth. It
considers the relevance of recent advances in growth theory for low-income countries
and compares the evidence for low-income countries with that for middle- and high-
income (OECD) countries.
Recent advances in endogenous growth theory have demonstrated that fiscal policy can
have long-run effects on economic growth rates where some taxes distort investment
decisions in the private sector (negative effect) and/or where some ‘productive’ public
expenditures compliment private investment (positive effect). Increasing budget deficits
can be expected to reduce long-run growth rates, unless tax-payers fully anticipate fiscal
policy changes and adjust their savings behaviour accordingly—a condition unlikely to
hold in low-income countries. Recent theory particularly stresses the importance for
growth of the following. …/…
Keywords: fiscal policy, public expenditure, taxation, economic growth
JEL classification: O23, O40— The composition of taxes and expenditures—distortionary versus non-
distortionary taxes; productive versus unproductive expenditures.
— The government budget constraint (GBC)—growth effects of additional public
spending inevitably must be balanced against the growth effects of the taxes or
deficits which finance them.
— Distinguishing the short- and long-run. Since most growth models agree that
fiscal-growth effects occur in the short-run, an important policy question
becomes: for how long do fiscal-growth effects persist?
There is a great deal of empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy on long-run
growth. Much of this however is methodologically weak rendering results unreliable.
Research prior to around 1997 (and some thereafter) generally ignores the GBC when
testing for fiscal effects and as a result produces non-comparable or apparently non-
robust results. More consistent evidence is found (though almost all of this is for the
OECD) when the growth effects of taxes, expenditures and deficits are examined
simultaneously—as the GBC suggests. Negative effects of taxes which distort
investment decisions (e.g. income taxes) and positive effects of ‘productive’
expenditures (e.g. capital spending such as infrastructure; education) are generally
found. Taxes on domestic goods and services and government recurrent and/or welfare
spending appear generally to have, at most, weak effects on long-run growth. Evidence
on the effects of redistribution (of which fiscal policy is a part) on growth is ambiguous,
consistent with the ambiguous predictions from current theorising. There is very little
reliable evidence available for LICs; limited evidence for LDCs more generally
suggests the possibility that fiscal-growth effects could be quite different from those
observed in OECD countries. Robust evidence of a negative association between budget
deficits and growth is beginning to emerge, though interpretations differ.1
Introduction
Can fiscal policy1 affect the long-term growth performance of low-income countries
(LICs)? The traditional answer from economic theory (either short-run comparative
static macro models or dynamic growth models such as Solow, 1956) to the more
general question of whether fiscal policy can affect growth, is that it can, at most, affect
the short-run growth rate of per capita income. As a result, over the long-run, the level
of income could be raised or lowered by fiscal changes (relative to some initial fiscal
policy stance) but in the long-run income growth will return to its initial rate.
Since the mid-1980s however, new endogenous growth models have proposed a number
of channels through which fiscal policy could have ‘permanent’ growth effects, raising
the prospect that fiscal policies could have much more substantial and enduring effects
on income levels and growth rates. Key characteristics of these models are: (a) factor
accumulation and/or technical progress are endogenously determined; and
(b) reproducible factors (physical and human capital) are not subject to diminishing
returns in aggregate. In this context, fiscal policy can have long-run effects to the extent
that it (i) affects factor accumulation (e.g. capital income taxes, public investment) or
(ii) influences technical progress (e.g. tax breaks for ‘hi-tech’ industries, public R&D).
To assess the implications of this literature for fiscal policy in practice in LICs it is
important to address a number of issues. For example, how valid are these new
endogenous growth models likely to be to LICs? What fiscal policy prescriptions, if
any, do they yield for LICs? What does the empirical evidence on fiscal-growth links
suggest for LICs?
This paper will address these questions. Section 1 outlines recent theories proposing
long-run fiscal-growth effects and considers their relevance to LICs. Section 2 then
reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation, public expenditure,
fiscal deficits and long-run growth assessing this in the light of both the theoretical
predictions and the applicability of currently available evidence to LICs.
It would, of course, be wrong to expect uniformity of experience in the fiscal-growth
relationship across LICs. Countries such as India and The Gambia, for example, as well
as sharing some features in common, have many differences. It is therefore important to
distinguish those aspects of fiscal policy which they might be expected to share from
those which are likely to differ. Examining regional differences among LICs (as some
of the evidence does) can help in this respect. Similarly, public finances generally
interact with the economy’s wider financial system, so that differences across LICs in
the level of financial development and government regulation can be important sources
of differences in fiscal-growth effects.
1 Fiscal policy is defined here as the level and structure of taxes and public expenditures, and the extent
of budget deficits. The latter is sometimes referred to as ‘macro-fiscal’ policy.2
1 Theory
1.1 Neoclassical versus endogenous growth models
The neoclassical model, following Solow (1956), predicts that long-run growth is
entirely determined by exogenous technical progress, typically assumed to grow at a
constant rate in the ‘steady-state’. Physical or human capital accumulation, (see Mankiw
et al. 1992) can only affect growth during ‘transitional’ periods when the economy is
out of its steady-state (e.g. following an increase in savings rates). In this case growth is
temporarily faster as the economy moves to a new income trajectory involving higher
income levels but the same long-run growth rate. Nevertheless, as Baxter and King
(1993) show, based on simulating a neoclassical model for the US, though fiscal policy
may not be able to change income growth permanently, its effects on income levels can
be substantial and may take twenty years or more to be fully realised. In many LIC
policy environments where time horizons are short (given the imperatives of poverty
reduction or political uncertainties) potential growth gains over twenty years could seem
very substantial even if there are no benefits beyond.
As noted in the Introduction, endogenous growth models have challenged the long-run
‘policy ineffectiveness’ prediction by modifying neoclassical assumptions.2 Among the
main ways in which fiscal policy affects growth in these endogenous models are the
following:
— production externalities—public capital/investment or education may enhance
private sector production (e.g. via complementarities between public
infrastructure and private investment. See Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990; Cashin,
1995). These are modelled as externalities because private sector firms are
assumed to ignore public ‘inputs’ in their profit-maximising decisions.
— productivity growth—fiscal policy may influence innovation, R&D etc.
(Romer, 1987, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Einersson and Marquis, 1997).
In LICs, a more likely channel is the impact of fiscal policy on the acquisition
of foreign technologies such as those embodied in imported capital and/or final
goods.
— productivity differencespublic/private sector efficiency differences provide
growth-affecting opportunities via inter-sectoral flows. (Ram, 1986; Dowrick,
1993). Such models involve assumed average and/or marginal productivity
differences between government and private sectors.
— fiscal effects on factor accumulation—either indirectly via incentive effects on
private accumulation or directly via public investment in physical or human
capital. (Lucas, 1988; King and Rebelo, 1990; Rebelo, 1991; Stokey and
Rebelo, 1995; Mendoza et al. 1997).
— crowding-out—to the extent that ‘unproductive’ public expenditures crowd-out
‘productive’ private or public investment (including education) long-run
growth can be affected (Barro, 1990; Devarajan et al. 1996; Milesi-Ferretti and
Roubini, 1998).
2 For reviews of this literature, see Aghion and Howitt (1998, chapter 10) and Myles (2000) .3
— Redistribution—policies aimed at redistribution can affect long-run growth by
a number of mechanisms: altering savings rates; providing social insurance and
overcoming capital market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Perotti,
1993; Sinn, 1996); helping to enforce private property rights (Cashin, 1995); or
via political economy factors such as median-voter effects (Persson and
Tabellini, 1992; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).
1.2 Growth effects of taxes and expenditures in a ‘Barro model’
Most endogenous models of fiscal policy and growth have focused on one side of the
government budget or the other—usually the tax side.3 Barro (1990)4 and Cashin
(1995) analyse both taxes and expenditures simultaneously, though both models
preclude deficit finance. For the purpose of evaluating the empirical literature on fiscal
policy and growth, the Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) models provide
a useful starting point. They adopt the standard Ramsey (1928) framework in which the
consumption path of a representative consumer is obtained by maximising an inter-
temporal utility function over an infinite horizon. There are n producers each producing




where k represents private capital and g is a publicly provided input (per capita). There
are therefore constant returns to total (public plus private) ‘capital’ inputs, k+g.5 The
government also produces consumption (‘unproductive’) goods per person, gc,w h i c h
enter utility functions but have no effect on production. The government balances its
budget in each period by raising a proportional tax on output at rate t and lump-sum
taxes per person of l, giving the constraint (in per capita terms):
g + gc = l + ty (2)
Of course, lump-sum (or non-distortionary) taxes do not affect the private sector’s
incentive to invest in the input good, whereas the taxes on output do. Thus, with an
isoelastic inter-temporal utility function, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show that the
long-run growth rate in this model (g) can be expressed as
g  =  l(1-t)(1-a)A
1/(1-a)(g/y)
a/(1-a) - m (3)
where l and m are constants that reflect parameters in the utility function, or
alternatively:





a/(1-a) - m (4)
3 Devarajan et al. (1996) is one of few studies to concentrate on the expenditure structure.
4 See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) who develop extensions to the basic Barro (1990) model.
5 Notice however that public inputs are specified as a flow (investment) rather than a stock of capital,
though this can readily be changed without altering the spirit of the model’s outcomes.4
Equations (3) and (4) show that the growth rate is decreasing in the rate of distortionary
taxes (t) and increasing in government productive expenditure (g), but is unaffected by
non-distortionary taxes (l) or unproductive expenditure (gc).6
These growth effects are summarised in the four cells in the north-west corner of the
matrix in Table 1 below. Though Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) exclude the possibility
of deficit finance, the framework is readily extended to include fiscal deficits: predicted
effects are also shown in Table 1 (and discussed below).
Table 1
Growth Effects of Taxes and Expenditures
Public Spending: Deficits:






Non-distort. Positive Zero Negative
Deficits: Ambiguous Negative —
Table 1 shows that not only do the predicted growth effects of taxes or expenditures
depend on the type of tax/expenditure considered (and hence the tax/expenditure mix,a s
well as the total level), but the overall effect of a tax or expenditure change depends on
how this is financed (compensating tax or expenditure change). This is reinforced when
budget surpluses/deficits are allowed (see below). Even where all government
expenditure is productive, the use of distortionary taxes to finance this can, at
sufficiently large tax/expenditure levels, generate negative growth effects.7
In an extension to the expenditure side of the Barro (1990) model, Devarajan et al.
(1996) consider the possibility of government expenditures which are productive to
varying degrees. They define productive expenditure as ‘that component of public
expenditure an increase in whose share will raise the steady-state growth rate of the
economy’ (Devarajan et al. 1996, p.317). They then show that the growth rate is a
function not just of the relative productivities of any two expenditure components, but
also of the relative shares of these components in total expenditure. For example, in the
two expenditure component case of (1) where
2 1 2 1
2 1
1 a a a a g g k y
- - = (1￿)
6 Thus, in (4) the growth effects of an increase in unproductive expenditures, gc, financed by lump-sum
taxes, l, cancel.
7 As Bajo-Rubio (2000) shows, a similar ‘inverted-U’ relationship between the growth rate and
government size is also consistent with an augmented Solow model (i.e. constant returns to total
capital are not required), though this only applies to transitional behaviour.5
it is possible to ‘over-allocate’ resources to a ‘more productive’ public expenditure
category (higher a), which will reduce growth. The intuition behind this result is that
while more productive categories have higher average productivity in equilibrium,
maximum steady-state growth is achieved where marginal productivities are equalised.
This equality determines the growth maximising public expenditure shares which, if
exceeded will cause lower marginal productivity (than elsewhere) in the ‘over-
expanded’ category.8 Therefore, in the Devarajan et al. model, the mix of different
expenditures, as well as the growth-enhancing potential of each, is important for long-
run growth outcomes.
For the Barro/Devarajan frameworks to be useful empirically, it is clearly important to
be able to distinguish productive from unproductive expenditures and distortionary from
non-distortionary taxes within public budgets in practice. On spending, a typical ‘first
approximation’ is to treat government consumption spending as ‘unproductive’ (i.e. it
affects consumers’ welfare but not private production efficiency) and treat investment
spending as ‘productive’. The latter should perhaps include (some or all?) education and
health spending because of their effects on human capital accumulation. The growth
effects of public expenditure on current transfers such as social security remains a
debated issue. If these merely affect welfare they can be treated analogously to other
‘unproductive’ expenditures. However, as noted above, transfers may affect savings
rates, inequality, enforcement of property rights, etc. and could therefore be either
growth enhancing or retarding depending on the empirical relevance of the various
hypothesised growth mechanisms. If the results of Devarajan et al. (1996) are correct—
though they may not be (see below)—then this ‘first approximation’ may turn out to be
quite misleading in poorer economies.
On taxation, in the Barro (1990) model ‘distortionary’ taxes are those distorting the
decision to invest—essentially capital and labour income taxes. With no labour-leisure-
education choices, consumption taxes are non-distorting. However, as Mendoza et al.
(1997) show, human capital investment can be affected by consumption taxes when
labour supply is endogenous. Clearly, in practice, almost all taxes are distortionary to
some degree and the key issue in searching for long-run effects of various taxes is
whether these distortions can be expected to be substantial or minor with respect to the
main determinants of long-run growth, such as investment, education and training, or
technical progress.
1.3 Budget deficits and growth
In extensions to the Barro-type model allowing budget deficits, whether these affect
growth depends on whether Ricardian Equivalence (RE) is assumed to hold—that is,
whether the private sector anticipates future taxes and adjusts its savings to compensate
fully for changes in public sector savings—and on whether all deficit-financed spending
is ‘productive’. If both these conditions hold, deficits are analogous to lump-sum taxes
and have no long-run growth effects.
8 It can be shown that the growth maximising expenditure shares are given by the ratio 2 1 /a a ,f o r
the Cobb-Douglas case in (1￿).6
Where RE does not hold (the assumption underlying Table 1), budget deficits are
generally expected to be growth-retarding, ceteris paribus. This can arise because total
savings are reduced (if the private sector does not fully adjust its savings or government
borrowing finances consumption goods provision), hence reducing factor accumulation.
Alternatively, as Tanzi and Zee (1997) argue, if deficits are perceived as unsustainable,
then changes in tax/expenditure policy and/or monetary policy will be anticipated.
Either is likely to retard growth via effects on investment from increases in expected
inflation or uncertainties associated with possible fiscal policy changes. Even if
monetary policy is designed to ‘neutralise’ the inflationary effects of a budget deficit,
growth is still likely to be retarded by the associated increases in interest rates.
From Table 1, the net effect on growth of increasing the budget deficit depends on the
simultaneous change in taxes and/or expenditures. For example, increasing the fiscal
deficit in conjunction with a reduction in distortionary taxes could be growth-enhancing
if the ceteris paribus growth-retarding effect of an increased deficit is out-weighed by
the ceteris paribus growth-enhancing effect of reductions in distortionary taxes. In this
case the method of financing the increased deficit could be important if alternative
financing sources involve different impacts on private sector savings and accumulation
decisions. Across LICs, this is likely to differ. Where governments (such as in India)
can sell their debt willingly to debt holders on domestic or foreign markets, the
crowding-out effects of deficits can be quite different compared to those in countries
where a strong element of compulsion is associated with sales of new public debt.
1.4 How relevant are endogenous fiscal-growth models to LICs?
Sections 1.1-2 outlined alternative models capable of generating long-run growth effects
of fiscal policy, focussing on the Barro (1990) framework upon which most subsequent
models have been built. But are these models relevant to LICs? At first sight it may
appear that the notion of a representative consumer optimising inter-temporally and
governments setting fiscal parameters accordingly is inappropriate in an LIC context,
where even static optimisation by consumers has been questioned. Similarly, is it
reasonable to assume non-diminishing returns to public and private capital in aggregate?
In fact, while the Ramsey inter-temporal framework is analytically convenient it is not
essential for endogenous growth outcomes. As Rebelo (1991) shows, in models with an
exogenous savings rate, endogenous long-run growth which is a positive function of
savings (and hence accumulation), can still be obtained.
On the issue of constant returns to capital, Rebelo (1991) also demonstrates that in
models with multiple capital goods, endogenous growth requires only that there are
non-diminishing returns for a ‘core’ of capital goods, with diminishing returns possible
in remaining capital and/or consumption goods sectors. Thus, for example, an equation
such as (1) could apply to the production of private capital or education. These
arguments are enhanced if externalities exist such that there are increasing returns at the
aggregate level. The question remains however over whether these ‘Ak’ type models are
l i k e l yt oa p p l yt oL I C s . 9 Could the productivity of aggregate public plus private capital
approach constant returns? Empirical evidence on this is, as yet, unclear. There may
well be relatively high returns to physical and human capital accumulation in many
9 Equation (1) represents an ‘Ak’ model expressed in terms of aggregate private-plus-public capital.7
LDCs, and there are potentially considerable complementarities between government
and private investment. However since many LDCs are also almost certainly some
distance from their production frontiers, current growth evidence of apparently high
returns to accumulation could reflect transitional behaviour as those LDCs acquire best-
practice technology.
This is especially relevant to African countries where negative shocks such as drought,
wars and internal strife lead to low or negative growth during the episode, followed by
high growth recovery periods. These latter episodes can sometimes be misinterpreted as
representing long-run performance whereas they actually represent temporary ‘catch-
up’, as spare capacity is used or rebuilt.
A related issue concerns the relevance to LICs of the distortionary/non-distortionary and
productive/unproductive distinctions in the Barro-type models. Distortionary taxes, for
example, have generally been associated with income taxes in OECD countries, with
consumption taxes regarded as non-distortionary (or at least ‘less distortionary’). LICs
however make relatively little use of income taxes and often have an assortment of
indirect taxes. This suggests the need for careful application, rather than rejection, of the
Barro/Devarajan framework to LICs.
Which particular taxes are distortionary and which expenditures are productive is an
empirical matter to be guided by ap r i o r ireasoning. For LICs, attention needs to be paid
to identifying which public expenditures are expected to be ‘productive’. For example,
in countries recovering from shocks such as wars, rebuilding human capital may be
crucial and much of this expenditure may appear as ‘recurrent’ rather than ‘capital’.
Indeed, a common misperception is to regard wage payments as ‘consumption
expenditures’ and therefore ‘unproductive’ whereas in fact a large portion of this is the
return to human capital accumulation. A ‘capital/recurrent’ distinction should not be
identified with a ‘productive/unproductive’ distinction.
In LICs where indirect taxes dominate the important issue is to identify possible
distortions to investment which might arise from these. The wide disparity in trade tax,
and domestic goods and service tax, rates may induce a variety of investment distortions
(e.g. sectoral misallocations) with consequent growth effects. Similarly, so-called
consumption spending, for example on social welfare, may have greater positive
externalities for private sector production than wasteful public capital spending (as,
indeed, Devarajan et al. 1996, allege—see below). Thus, with sensitivity to country-
specific circumstances, the tax/expenditure distinctions suggested by endogenous
growth theory provide valuable insights for LICs.
Apart from factor accumulation, alternative endogenous growth models stress the
process of knowledge creation and the design and application of new ideas which raise
productivity, as the source of endogenous growth. Key ingredients of these models are
typically R&D expenditures and/or the supply of ‘scientists and engineers’—the human
capital necessary for innovation. While most LICs clearly are not likely to be at the
forefront of new knowledge creation, these models also stress the importance of
adoption of new technologies, or their adaptation to local conditions (see, for example,
Bernard and Jones, 1996). Thus fiscal policy in LICs which inhibits or encourages the
adoption of new technologies may have the potential for long-run growth effects. To the
extent that the acquisition of new technology involves trade or ‘openness’, fiscal policy
(especially trade-related) may have substantive growth effects. This analysis suggest8
that, whereas in OECD countries tax credits for R&D and activities and innovation
might be growth-enhancing, in LICs tax incentives to particular foreign investments
might be more appropriate.
Considering its potential importance there is surprisingly little direct evidence on the
technology transfer-growth relationship for LDCs (though evidence for OECD countries
is encouraging). There is, of course, an extensive literature on technology transfer via
foreign direct investment (FDI)—some relating to LDCs—and whether this is
associated with trade or openness. (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997, provide an LDC-
specific survey). Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and Taylor (2000) find some evidence
that FDI is more growth enhancing in relatively ‘open’ economies though this could be
proxying for a number of features (such as competitiveness), and fiscal dimensions of
openness (e.g. trade taxes) may be relatively unimportant. Recent evidence on the
spillovers from FDI in LDCs is more encouraging than some early studies suggested but
a consensus on the magnitudes and mechanisms of FDI spillovers seems some way
off.10 In addition, much of this evidence relates to manufacturing technology whereas
for some LICs agricultural technology transfer is most relevant—an under-research
aspect of the FDI/technology transfer debate.
Section 1.1 highlighed a further set of models which allow for the possibility that
government is less efficient than the private sector (e.g. Ram 1986; Dowrick, 1993).
Care needs to be taken in applying these models since they are typically designed to
capture the notion of two otherwise identical goods being produced in different sectors,
whereas in practice government and private sector activities may be quite different. The
technologies available for these different activities might therefore dictate that average
productivity is lower in the government sector (though, in the absence of barriers to
inter-sectoral flows, marginal productivities could be equalised). Where marginal
productivity is lower in government activities, growth can be enhanced by an
expenditure (and tax) reducing policy, shifting resources to higher productivity private
activities. This is clearly a case where the range of objectives of fiscal policy (including
growth) need to be considered carefully to identify policy trade-offs.
Do the models considered in Section 1 yield specific guidance on the appropriate or
‘optimal’ fiscal policy for growth in LICs? It is self-evident that substituting taxes
which avoid investment distortions for those which distort investment decisions, and
reallocating expenditures towards ‘productive’ categories (where the latter are below the
‘optimum’) will enhance growth. Beyond this however, care needs to be exercised in
drawing out fiscal policy prescriptions. For example, a recent literature has begun to
examine whether, or in what circumstances, it is optimal to set low or zero capital
income tax rates, in order to avoid growth-inhibiting distortions to investment. It turns
out the appropriate capital income tax policy is sensitive to several model assumptions
including the exogeneity or otherwise of fertility—a debated issue for LICs.11
10 See Moran (1998) for an interesting assessment of the contribution of FDI to development.
11 Myles (2000) provides a helpful discussion of these capital tax issues.9
2 Reviewing the empirical evidence
This section reviews evidence on the long-run fiscal-growth effects which emerge from
the ‘growth regression’ literature, beginning with discussion of some methodological
issues.
2.1 Methodological issues
The empirical fiscal-growth literature is of highly variable quality and has generally
yielded non-robust results. To some extent this reflects changes in empirical
methodologies over time and a tendency for many studies to test various ad hoc
hypotheses or give insufficient attention to theoretical, as well as econometric,
specifications. Of course, the growth regression methodology in general has been the
subject of numerous criticisms (reviewed in detail by Temple, 1999). Most of these
apply also to tests for fiscal effects and will not be repeated here. However, a few issues
especially relevant to the fiscal-growth context deserve some discussion.
First, data constraints are particularly severe both because suitable data on fiscal
variables are unavailable for many countries, and because of the quality of available
data, the most reliable source being the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics.
Devarajan et al. (1996), probably the most comprehensive study of this type for LDCs,
(but using only public expenditure related variables) are able to include 43 LDCs
(including 19 LICs; 18 sub-Saharan African countries). However, when tax variables
are also required, much less data are available—Miller and Russek (1997) for example
are restricted to 22 LDCs (of which only 3 are LICs). An additional problem with fiscal
variables is that the conceptual variable being tested is generally a marginal tax rate or
the marginal contribution of public expenditure to growth, whereas available data
typically relate to average tax rates or expenditure/ GDP ratios.12 As a result empirical
investigators often experiment with alternative fiscal indicators which sometimes
produce inconsistent results (see, for example, Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
Second, the regression specifications of many studies are inadequate. While few studies
follow the dubious practice of Fischer (1993) by including only a single variable in a
growth regression (the budget surplus, in his case), many studies have explored fiscal
effects by adding a single fiscal variables to a growth regression including an
assortment of control variables. Levine and Renelt (1992) demonstrate the non-robust
outcomes that this procedure generates. In addition, few empirical studies have tackled
the problem of the endogeneity of fiscal policy—that fiscal variables respond to growth
as well as vice versa (either ‘automatically’ or due to discretionary government actions).
Those which do attempt to deal with endogeneity typically find it hard to identify
suitable instruments so that their instrumental variable (IV) methods may not be
reliable.
Third, an important specification issue which casts doubt on the reliability of almost all
fiscal-growth regressions for LDCs is their failure to deal adequately with the
12 Problems with using tax/GDP ratios are compounded by the fact that these reflect both the impact of
differences in tax rates (the variable of interest) and tax bases. For expenditure/GDP ratios, all studies
assume that the marginal growth impact is captured by these average ratios.10
government budget constraint (GBC). In particular, either taxes or expenditures (or
some sub-sets of each) are included in most regressions with the result that regression
evidence can be mis-interpreted. Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001), show
the importance of this for empirical estimates for OECD countries and formalise a
methodology for incorporating the GBC which is related explicitly to the kinds of
theoretical models by Barro (1990) and Mendoza et al. (1997) discussed above.
The basis of their argument is that the parameters on fiscal variables included in
regressions should be interpreted as the growth effect of those fiscal categories,
financed by any omitted fiscal categories. To avoid mis-specification problems, only
‘neutral’ fiscal categories (those predicted to have a zero growth impact in Table 1)
should be omitted from regressions. Empirical tests should therefore first establish
which categories are neutral and these can legitimately be omitted from regressions.
The parameters on included fiscal variables can then be interpreted as the ceteris paribus
impact of the relevant included categories.13 Unfortunately, most studies prior to
Kneller et al. (1999) are imprecise in their specification of the GBC and generally omit
non-neutral as well as neutral fiscal categories from regressions. As the review of
empirical studies below shows, Miller and Russek (1997) is the only study including
LDCs to attempt to address the GBC issue. They report results for 22 LDCs but fiscal
categories omitted from their regressions are probably not all neutral.
In addition to the numerous studies which address the question of the impact of fiscal
policy on growth directly, many studies have included fiscal (or ‘macro-fiscal’) policy
variables in regressions where the main focus is on other sources of growth. These
studies are especially subject to the GBC problem discussed above. Thus for example, a
‘government share’ variable (usually the ratio of government consumption expenditures
to GDP) is frequently included among conditioning variables (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). Similarly, studies of the broader impact of ‘policy’ on growth (see
Mosley, 2000, for discussion and examples) and the recent aid-growth literature
commonly include either a government size measure or budget deficit (the latter often
presumed to capture macroeconomic stability).14 Since these are usually the only
government measure included in regressions they will capture some composite of all the
possible effects identified in Table 1, and signs/significance become impossible to
interpret.
Finally, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) point to an important testing problem—the
optimality (or otherwise) of government policy. That is, the expected relationship
between fiscal policy and growth may depend on whether governments set tax rates
(and, by extension, other fiscal variables) optimally. For example, as we have seen, the
Barro (1990) model predicts an inverted-U relationship between government size and
the economy’s growth rate (when this involves productive expenditure and distortionary
taxes). In cross-country regressions, if governments choose tax/expenditure levels
randomly, we might expect to observe countries at various points on the inverted-U
13 Miller and Russek (1997) also discuss this ‘financing’ issue but fail to identify ‘neutral’ categories
either ap r i o r ior empirically.
14 Early examples include Easterly (1993) and Fischer (1993). On the inclusion of policy variables in the
aid-growth literature, see Burnside and Dollar (2001), Collier and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp
(1999).11
curve and should test accordingly. However, if governments attempt to set fiscal
parameters at the growth-maximising optimum, countries can be expected to be
clustered around this government-growth combination. Of course, if the efficiency with
which governments deliver services or raise taxes differs (i.e. the production function in
(1) differs across countries) then very different growth rate-government size
combinations may be observed which could give rise to a positive or a negative
relationship. It then becomes impossible to sign predicted fiscal parameters in a cross-
country growth regression.
Overall therefore, the empirical evidence on the links between fiscal policy and growth
should be regarded with some caution. There are several methodological weaknesses
associated with most studies. Though these are being addressed in current research it
remains unclear whether existing evidence of non-robust fiscal-growth impacts reflect
genuinely different experience in different countries/time periods, or are the result of
testing weaknesses, or both.
2.2 Evidence on the growth effects of taxes and expenditures
Given the methodological problems discussed above most empirical fiscal-growth
estimates must be regarded as unreliable and in some case are positively misleading.
For example, as de la Fuente (1997) and Kneller et al. (1999) demonstrate, including
fiscal variables in a growth regression one at a time can lead to changes in parameter
signs and significance compared to more fully specified regressions. As an aid to
evaluating results, we split the literature into First, Second and Third Generation
studies; Table 2 provides a summary of results from studies including taxes and/or
public expenditures.
First Generation studies essentially pre-date endogenous growth models of Romer
(1986, 1987) and Barro (1990) and test a variety of more ad hoc hypotheses related to
the impact of government on growth. Many of these grew out of public choice concerns
over government growth during the 1960s and 1970s. They are generally poorly
specified, use limited data, and employ econometric techniques which would now be
regarded as unreliable. Unsurprisingly, results are non-robust or non-comparable.
Second Generation studies have typically been inspired by the predictions of
neoclassical and/or endogenous growth models involving fiscal policy. Econometric
methods are generally more sophisticated than first generation studies (at least for the
more recent ones) with some attempts to deal with endogeneity problems. However, the
empirical specifications of second generation studies are generally only loosely tied to
the theories which inspire them. In particular, most papers in this group test for either
tax or public expenditure or fiscal deficit effects on growth, ignoring the role of the
government budget constraint and the importance of implicit (tax or debt) financing of
expenditures as summarised in Table 1 above. Second generation studies also, with a
few exceptions, rely on cross-section methods.
To qualify as a ‘Third Generation’ study in Table 2, investigations must: (a) recognise
(implicitly or explicitly) the role of the government budget constraint when testing for
fiscal effects, by examining at least two of tax/expenditure/deficit effects
simultaneously rather than separately; and (b) adopt recent advances in panel or time-
series econometrics, including testing for the endogeneity of fiscal policy.12
As Table 2 demonstrates, results from first and second generation studies reveal non-
robustness with similar fiscal variables apparently producing strong positive, negative
or no significant effects. To some extent this probably reflects the different samples, the
variety of variables used and methods of measuring a given variable. However, as the
papers by Agell et al. (1997, 1999) and Folster and Henrekson (1997) reveal, even when
the same dataset and variables are used, econometric specification differences can lead
to widely differing outcomes.
The failure of these studies to control for the GBC undoubtedly contributes to the
apparently non-robust outcomes. Not only are GBC elements omitted from regression
specifications but included fiscal elements are given a variety of interpretations, often
acting as a proxy for some conceptual variable derived from a growth model. Thus,
Easterly (1993) for example, proposes a formal/informal sector model in which tax rates
differ across sectors. In his empirical testing he includes government consumption as
‘an indicator of high taxes on the formal sector’ (p. 201). Whether a significant negative
parameter estimate should be interpreted as ‘government consumption spending is
harmful for growth’ or ‘high formal sector taxes are harmful for growth’ or both is
unclear, but with numerous other interpretations possible it would be dangerous to draw
any conclusions from such flawed regression evidence. Unfortunately, this conflation of
tax with expenditure variables is commonplace among first and second generation
studies.15
With the exception of Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001), most third
generation studies are imprecise in their application of the GBC and/or the incorporation
of the GBC is not related explicitly to the kinds of theoretical models proposed by Barro
(1990) and Mendoza et al. (1997). Thus, when unspecified (but probably non-neutral)
fiscal variables are omitted from regressions it becomes difficult to interpret results
reliably. In addition, as Table 2 shows, almost all third generation studies relate to
OECD countries, with Miller and Russek (1997) an exception (though, as noted above,
their omitted fiscal categories are probably not all neutral).
Nevertheless, it can be seen in Table 2 that the results of third generation research
appear to be more robust. In general, the taxes tested have negative growth effects while
at least some public investment spending impacts positively on growth. Consumption
and social security spending are found to have zero or negative growth effects, except
Cashin (1995) who finds a positive growth stimulus from welfare spending. This latter
result could however arise from the omission of consumption spending and/or
government deficits from his estimating equations. As the results in Miller and Russek
(1997), de la Fuente (1997) and Kneller et al. (1999) demonstrate, mis-specifying the
GBC by omitting non-neutral fiscal categories, can lead to very different parameters on
included fiscal variables (including sign changes) but this need not imply non-
robustness. Rather it may reflect differences in the implicit financing categories which
are omitted.
15 This issue is further complicated by the existence of ‘unofficial taxes’ in the form of bribes. If higher
official taxes allow improved employee compensation such that bribes are reduced, the net effect
could be more positive than a focus on formal tax rates would suggest. See Wei (1997) for evidence of
such effects on foreign investment.13
Table 1 indicated that the impact of productive government spending on growth
(financed by distortionary taxes) can be expected to be first positive and then negative
as government size increases (subject to the caveats mentioned above). De la Fuente
(1997) is the only study to allow explicitly for this non-linearity and, using quadratic
terms in regressions, he finds strong supporting evidence for this prediction with
reference to public capital spending.16 Unfortunately, this study relates only to OECD
countries. There is no comparable evidence on whether there is some growth-
maximising size of public expenditures relevant to LICs.
2.3 Evidence on the growth effects of budget deficits
Empirical evidence on the impact of budget deficits is not identified in Table 2. Where
these have been tested explicitly, they have often revealed significantly negative growth
effects (positive effects of surpluses). Among early studies, Martin and Fardmanesh
(1990) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find negative deficit-growth effects, and various
subsequent studies which have added a budget deficit variable to a growth regression
(often as a macroeconomic stability proxy or as one of a set of ‘policy’ measures) have
found a negative correlation (see Easterly et al. 1993, 1994; Devarajan et al. 1999;
Mosley, 2000).
In fact, despite the methodological weaknesses, one of the more robust pieces of
evidence from fiscal-growth regressions is the negative association between growth and
budget deficits, which is supported by the third generation studies of Miller and Russek
(1997), de la Fuente (1997), Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001). With many
of these results coming from a variety of mis-specified equations (so that deficits may
capture the combined effects of taxes, expenditures and deficit financing), their
robustness is perhaps all the more noteworthy.
One interpretation of this evidence is that, regardless of whether government size is
large or small, and regardless of the mix of taxes and expenditures, budget deficits are
bad for growth. It remains unclear however whether budget deficits in growth
regressions represent a proxy for an unsustainable fiscal stance (signalling growing
public debt) or poor macroeconomic policy more generally or both. In any case, any
deficit-growth effects are likely to depend on the nature of the financial market for
government debt. Where repressed financial markets prevail and/or where there is little
foreign demand for government debt, crowding-out could be greater than where
government paper is readily traded.
Finally, the deficit-growth relationship is one likely to be especially subject to
endogeneity problems with low growth precipitating higher deficits as governments
attempt to smooth consumption. Separating long- and short-run effects of deficits then
becomes an important empirical testing issue but one that has received little attention.
16 Spending on potentially productive health and education appear to be treated as consumption spending
in de la Fuente’s dataset. Quadratic effects are therefore not investigated for those expenditures.14
3.4 Fiscal policy, redistribution and growth
The primary objective of much fiscal policy is often income redistribution. So, does
fiscal policy aimed at redistribution help or hinder growth? We saw in Section 1 that
theory is ambiguous on this question. Direct tests of redistribution-growth hypotheses
are likely to be difficult because of the problem of separating the redistributive from
other aspects of fiscal policy. Most attempts to answer this question have either assumed
that social welfare spending captures this aspect or have tested the relationship between
inequality and growth.
Evidence from recent research on social welfare spending on growth generally finds
weak or ambiguous effects (see Table 2). On inequality-growth effects, it would be
dangerous to conclude from any observed relationship that fiscal policy with an
explicitly redistributive objective would necessarily enhance or hinder growth. Such a
policy is likely simultaneously to have other effects (e.g. via tax distortions), and the
growth effects of policy-induced changes in inequality may differ from those arising
from other sources (e.g. technical progress). In addition, while until recently some
consensus seemed to be emerging of a virtuous circle of faster growth and reduced
inequality, new evidence from Forbes (2000) suggests that such a conclusion may be
premature.
Paying careful attention to endogeneity problems, Forbes shows that while a negative
correlation between growth and inequality may exist across countries (countries with
lower inequality have faster growth, ceteris paribus), over time, reductions in inequality
appear to be associated, ceteris paribus, with slower growth at least in the medium term.
Much of this evidence relates to LDCs and is likely to be particularly relevant to LICs.
Unfortunately since fiscal policy variables are not considered explicitly in the analysis,
it remains unclear how much of any changes in inequality (and associated growth
effects) can be attributed to fiscal policy actions. However, since the inequality
measures used in this context are typically measures of the distribution of pre-tax
incomes, it is doubtful that this is substantially affected by tax/expenditure policies.
Nevertheless, any direct adverse growth effects of reduced inequality could be
compounded if this reduces the tax base (below what it otherwise would have been) and
hence reduces productive public expenditure.
3.4 Are LDCs different?
Since almost all of the methodologically more reliable evidence comes form OECD
countries, can we expect this evidence to apply also to LDCs in general or LICs in
particular? Two pieces of evidence suggest caution. First, Miller and Russek (1997)—
who include a range of taxes and expenditures in their growth regressions—find
opposite results for the LDCs in their sample compared to those for developed
countries. Whereas education spending is found to raise growth across OECD countries
it is associated with lower growth in LDCs. Of course, this result could reflect
inefficiency in education spending (e.g. favouring higher education when
primary/secondary education are more growth enhancing) and would therefore imply a
reallocation, rather than reduction, in education spending to achieve faster growth.15
Other public ‘investment’ spending items, such as defence and health, also appear to be
associated with lower growth in LDCs but not in the OECD. Equally controversially,
income taxes appear to be associated with reduced growth in the OECD but raise it in
LDCs.
Second, Devarajan et al. (1996)—who ignore taxes in their analysis—also find that
although public capital spending boosts growth while consumption spending reduces it
in OECD countries, the reverse appears to hold in LDCs. For an African sample of
mainly LICs, Devarajan et al. (1999) and Calamitsis et al. (1999) find little or no
evidence of growth effects from public investment (though budget deficits have
significant negative effects).17 This expenditure evidence is broadly consistent with
Miller and Russek, despite very different specifications, and is worrying for those
wishing to derive policy conclusions for LDCs or LICs. It suggests fiscal effects which
are the reverse of those predicted by theory and of those found (by third generation
studies) in developed countries. For African countries, however, Khan and Kumar
(1997) and Hadjimichael et al. (1995) find stronger evidence of positive growth effects
from public investment spending.
The current picture is therefore one of some confusion and may well arise partly from
data quality problems. Only with respect to budget deficits is some consistency found,
with Miller and Russek generally finding (implicitly) that deficit-financed increases in
public expenditures are harmful for growth. Devarajan et al. (1999) find similar
evidence for a sub-Saharan African sample (using a very limited regression
specification).
Without more extensive and reliable evidence for LDCs/LICs it would be premature to
draw policy conclusions. Nevertheless, current evidence is consistent with the view,
often expressed, that aid donors insistence on capital spending without adequate
provision for the accompanying recurrent expenditure, has led to a misallocation in the
capital/recurrent mix of public spending which is harmful for growth. In addition, where
public investment has supported low return activities (e.g. via SOEs, ‘prestige’ projects,
import-substitution) it is not surprising if positive growth effects from public investment
cannot be identified. An interesting issue remains whether trade and fiscal reforms in
many LDCs in the last decade or so has changed this situation—an issue on which
current evidence is silent.
Finally, it may be that if fiscal-growth effects exist and are mediated through private
investment (the Barro model mechanism), more reliable empirical evidence will emerge
by investigating the links between fiscal policy and investment on the one hand, and
investment and growth on the other, rather than the reduced-form relationship between
fiscal policy and output growth. Notwithstanding the current debate over the impact of
private investment on growth in African LICs, it is possible, even if this link is strong,
that fiscal policy has minimal impact on private investment.18
17 The Devarajan et al. (1999) public investment definition is very broad and the quality/reliability of the
data is probably low.
18 On the latter, see Hermes and Lensink (2000).16
3 Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the recent literature on the relationship between fiscal policy
variables—taxes, public expenditures and budget deficits—on growth, focusing on
recent advances in theory and on empirical evidence. It has also sought to assess the
relevance of this literature for the fiscal policy-growth relationship in LICs.
On theory, endogenous growth models developed in the last decade or so suggest the
possibility of long-run steady-state effects of fiscal policy on growth, drawing important
distinctions between taxes which distort the decision to invest (including investment in
education) and those which do not, and public expenditures which affect private
production rather than consumer’s utility. Interestingly, recent extensions to
neoclassical growth models point in a similar direction though long term fiscal effects
on growth in these models rely on economies being away from their steady-states for
extended periods of time. The question of whether observed growth in OECD or
developing countries over past decades represents transitional dynamics or steady-state
behaviour remains contentious. Though the framework underlying many of these
models involves fairly restrictive assumptions, this paper has suggested nevertheless
that there are useful insights regarding the impact of fiscal variables on growth in LICs.
In many cases these dynamic models stress the same kinds of factors emphasised in
standard static optimising models—for example, stressing the need to examine the
potential distortions arising from different taxes and the possibilities of externalities
between public expenditures and private production.
What can we learn from the existing empirical literature? First, results from first and
second generation studies should be treated with extreme caution both because of their
failure to deal correctly with government budget constraint issues and because, in many
cases, cross-section econometric methods are now regarded as of questionable
reliability. The apparent non-robustness of those studies may simply reflect the net
effects of alternative methods of financing tax/expenditure changes, where non-neutral
fiscal categories have been omitted. It is clear however that it makes no sense to analyse
the growth impact of any one fiscal change without simultaneously assessing the effects
of the opposing fiscal changes associated with it.
Second, there remain sufficient doubts over the reliability and generality of the more
consistent OECD results that further work is required before fiscal-growth effects can
be reliably identified for policy advice purposes in LICs. In addition, the confusing
evidence on the effects of government spending and macro policy variables such as
budget deficits in LICs may reflect the fact that, for many (e.g. African) countries, sharp
changes in policy every few years mean that there is simply too much short-term ‘noise’
in existing data to discern long-run effects. This compounds the problem referred of
more volatile in LICs for exogenous reasons, with growth ‘collapses’ and ‘recoveries’
common in some African countries. Further, research relating to relatively short periods
(e.g. Devarajan et al., 1999) are probably best interpreted as transitional effects of
uncertain duration.
Overall, the literature reviewed in this paper suggests that, although theory increasingly
provides guidance on the kinds of growth responses to fiscal policy which might be
expected in LICs, few models address LIC conditions directly. Caution must therefore
be exercise in applying these models to LIC contexts. On the empirical side, evidence so
far is, in general, either lacking or inadequate as a guide to policy advice in practice.17
Economists advising LDC governments on how policy can be improved to foster
growth should generally be wary of anticipating long-run growth benefits from fiscal
changes, based on currently available evidence. This is not to deny the apparent short-
term gains from rectifying obvious fiscal inefficiencies such as unsustainable budget
deficits.
Finally, can foreign aid to LICs overcome the fiscal budget constraints stressed in this
paper? The simple answer to this question is ‘no’: aid alters the precise specification of
the budget constraint but foreign aid should be thought of like any other budget
financing element, together with any public expenditure implications associated with
the aid inflow. Even if we assume that private sector behaviour (e.g. savings rates) is
unaffected by the inflow, aid generally represents a form of public borrowing with an
associated future cost. The growth effects of aid-financed expenditures should therefore
be assessed in the light of the same kind of cost-benefit calculations which would
underlie any borrowing-financed increase in public expenditure, including potential
crowding-out effects.
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